Contract Details

Addresses of deployed smart contracts and trusted multisigs in the Strata Protocol.

Strata v1

Github: https://github.com/Strata-Money/contracts-tranches

Contracts Addresses

Contract	Address
srUSDe	0x3d7d6fdf07EE548B939A80edbc9B2256d0cdc003
jrUSDe	0xC58D044404d8B14e953C115E67823784dEA53d8F
StrataCDO	0x908B3921aaE4fC17191D382BB61020f2Ee6C0e20
Accounting	0xa436c5Dd1Ba62c55D112C10cd10E988bb3355102
TwoStepConfigManager	0x0f93bAC77c3dDD1341d3Ecc388c5F8A180818994
sUSDeStrategy	0xdbf4FB6C310C1C85D0b41B5DbCA06096F2E7099F
ERC20Cooldown	0xd6dAD17d025cDdDEd27305aEbAB8b277996A6fAF
UnstakeCooldown	0x735edDF50Ca2371aa48466469C742e684c610F74
SUSDeCooldownRequestImpl	0x00A96056c30A22b684fF7a09F4A0AfEaE426dde2
TrancheDepositor	0x50E850641F43F65BF8fB3a7d0CF082a1D252F47e
AprPairFeed	0x2bb416614D740E5313aA64A0E3e419B39e800EC2
AaveAprPairProvider	0x1c137776e04803F807616c382AbBA12d9BF0AF73

Contracts Descriptions

srUSDe

Senior Tranche — an ERC-4626 Meta Vault supporting deposits and redemptions in multiple tokens.

jrUSDe

Junior Tranche — uses the same codebase as the Senior Tranche. Reward and behavior differences are handled by the StrataCDO.

StrataCDO

Strata CDO Orchestrator — connects all core protocol components: Tranches, Accounting, Strategy.

Accounting

Performs raw TVL calculations for Junior, Senior, and Reserve. Tracks balances, inflows/outflows, accrues fees, and distributes rewards.

TwoStepConfigManager

Manages exit-fee updates through a secure, two-step governance process: Step 1 – Schedule: A new exit-fee configuration is proposed and queued (callable by PROPOSER_CONFIG_ROLE). Step 2 – Execute: After the mandatory delay has elapsed, the scheduled configuration can be applied to the underlying CDO (callable by UPDATER_STRAT_CONFIG_ROLE).

sUSDeStrategy

Handles deposits of USDe into the sUSDe Vault (also accepts sUSDe directly). Manages instant and cooldown-based withdrawals, routing tokens through the correct cooldown contracts when required.

ERC20Cooldown

Locks ERC-20 tokens for a specified cooldown period before withdrawal finalization.

UnstakeCooldown

Handles unstaking-required assets before withdrawals. Users finalize withdrawal after the unstake period completes.

SUSDeCooldownRequestImpl

Implements the cooldown and unstaking workflow specifically for sUSDe withdrawals.

TrancheDepositor

Utility contract used to route deposits from various sources (pUSDe redemptions, USDe/sUSDe swap routes) before depositing into a Tranche.

AprPairFeed

Provides the Collateral and Benchmark APY inputs used by the Accounting contract for TVL and reward calculations.

AaveAprPairProvider

Fetches and computes raw APR values from Aave — including both the Benchmark APR and the Collateral APR sourced from the sUSDe Vault.

Trusted Addresses

Name	Address
Admin Multisig (3/4)	0xA27cA9292268ee0f0258B749f1D5740c9Bb68B50
Operational Multisig (2/3)	0x4be3749a0F6557b8fd98F3967e859DbD7C694eF4
Timelock (48hr)	0xb2A3CF69C97AFD4dE7882E5fEE120e4efC77B706
Timelock (24hr)	0x4f2682b78F37910704fB1AFF29358A1da07E022d
Guardian	0x277D26a45Add5775F21256159F089769892CEa5B

Admin Multisig

• 3-of-4 Gnosis Safe

  • All signers are cold wallets

  • 4 keys held by internal team members and founding core contributors

• Internal team members have separate signing devices

  • At least three signers must validate that the transaction hashes being signed on the UI match what the wallet sees

Operational Multisig

• 2-of-3 Gnosis Safe

  • All signers are cold wallets

• All keys held by internal team members and founding core contributors

• Internal team members have separate signing devices

  • At least two signers must validate that the transaction hashes being signed on the UI match what the wallet sees

Timelock (48hr)

• Minimum Delay: 48 hours

• PROPOSER_ROLE: Admin Multisig (0xA27cA9292268ee0f0258B749f1D5740c9Bb68B50)

• CANCELLER_ROLE: Guardian (0x277D26a45Add5775F21256159F089769892CEa5B)

Timelock (24hr)

• Minimum Delay: 24 hours

• PROPOSER_ROLE: Admin Multisig (0xA27cA9292268ee0f0258B749f1D5740c9Bb68B50)

Guardian

• Patrick Collins: Security Researcher, Co-Founder & CEO at Cyfrin

• Provides an additional security layer on top of the timelocks and enhances protocol safety by preventing malicious, compromised, or unsafe governance actions during the timelock delay window

  • Veto/Cancel Timelock Actions: Holds the authority to cancel harmful or suspicious timelock transactions before execution

  • Active Monitoring: Continuously monitors queued timelock transactions using a combination of custom internal monitoring tools and third-party security systems (e.g. Hypernative).

  • Threat Mitigation: Responds to anomalies by cancelling transactions and alerting contributors